This paper considers the problem of an agent or a team of agents searching for a resource or tangible good in a physical environment, where the resource or good may possibly be obtained at one of several locations. The cost of acquiring the resource or good at a given location is uncertain (a priori), and the agents can observe the true cost only when physically arriving at this location. Sample applications include agents in exploration and patrol missions (e.g., an agent seeking to find the best location to deploy sensing equipment along its path). The uniqueness of these settings is in that the cost of observing a new location is determined by distance from the current one, impacting the consideration for the optimal search order. Although this model captures many real world scenarios, it has not been investigated so far. We analyze three variants of the problem, differing in their objective: minimizing the total expected cost, maximizing the success probability given an initial budget, and minimizing the budget necessary to obtain a given success probability. For each variant, we first introduce and analyze the problem with a single agent, either providing a polynomial solution to the problem or proving it is NP-complete. We also introduce a fully polynomial time approximation scheme algorithm for the minimum budget variant. In the multi-agent case, we analyze two models for managing resources, shared and private budget models. We present polynomial algorithms that work for any fixed number of agents, in the shared or private budget model. For non-communicating agents in the private budget model, we present a polynomial algorithm that is suitable for any number of agents. We also analyze the difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous agents, both with respect to their allotted resources and with respect to their capabilities. Finally, we define our problem in an environment with self-interested agents. We show how to find a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time, and prove that the bound on the performance of our algorithms, with respect to the social welfare, is tight.
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Introduction
Frequently, in order to successfully complete its task, an agent may need to explore (i.e., search) its environment and choose among different available options. For example, an agent seeking to purchase a product over the Internet needs to query several electronic merchants in order to learn their posted prices; a robot searching for a resource or a tangible good needs to travel to possible locations where the resource is available and learn the configuration in which it is available, as well as the difficulty of obtaining it there. In these environments, the benefit associated with an opportunity is revealed only upon observing it. The only knowledge available to the agent prior to observing the opportunity is the probability associated with each possible value of each prospect.
While in virtual environments the exploration can sometimes be considered costless, in physical environments traveling and observing typically entails a cost. Furthermore, traveling to a new location may increase or decrease the distance to other locations, so the cost associated with exploring other unexplored locations changes. For example, consider a Rover robot with the goal of mining a certain mineral. Potential mining locations may be identified based on satellite imaging, each location associated with some uncertainty regarding the difficulty of mining there. In order to assess the amount of battery power required for mining at a specific location, the robot needs to physically visit there. The robot's battery is thus used not only for mining the mineral but also for traveling from one potential location to another. Consequently, an agent's strategy in an environment associated with search costs should maximize the overall benefit resulting from the search process, defined as the value of the option eventually used, minus the costs accumulated along the process, rather than merely finding the best valued option.
In physical environments, it is common to use a team of agents rather than a single agent. Extending the single agent solution to multi-agent strategy may require subdividing the search space among the different agents. However, if agents have means of communication, then they may not wish to become too distant, as they can call upon each other for assistance. For example, even if a Rover does not have sufficient battery power for mining at a given location, it may be useful for it to travel to the site in order to determine the exact mining cost, and call for other robots that do have the necessary battery power. In this case, the scheduling of the robots' travel times is key, and must be carefully planned. If the agents are not fully cooperative, a selfish behavior should also be considered. Each one of the agents will try to minimize its traveling costs while still achieving the group's goal.
Finally, agents may be of different types, or with different amounts of resources. For example, Rover robots may be entering the mission with differing initial battery charges. They may also differ in their capabilities, like a team of Rovers in which some were specifically designed for mining missions, and thus require less battery power for the same mining task.
This paper aims at taking the first steps in understanding the characteristics of such physical search environments, both for the single and multi agent cases, and developing efficient exploration strategies for the like. Our main focus is on the case where the opportunities are aligned along a path, as in the case of perimeter patrol [60, 19, 2, 3] . We note that many single and multi-agent coverage algorithms convert their complex environment into a simple long path [52, 25, 32] . Furthermore, we show that the problem in more general metric spaces is NP-complete, even for a tree graphs. For exposition purposes, in the remainder of the paper we use the classical procurement application where the goal of the search is purchasing a product and the value of each observed opportunity represents a price. Of course, this is only one example of the general setting of exploration in a physical environment, and the discussion and results of this paper are relevant to any such setting, provided that exploration and fulfilling the task consume the same type of resource.
We consider three variants of the problem, differing in their objective. The first (Min-Expected-Cost) is the problem of an agent that aims to minimize the expected total cost of completing its task. The second (Max-Probability) considers an agent that is given a budget for the task (which it cannot exceed) and aims to maximize the probability it will complete the task (e.g., reach at least one opportunity with a budget large enough to successfully buy the product). In the last variant (Min-Budget) the agent is required to guarantee a pre-defined probability of completing the task, and aims to minimize the overall budget that will be required to achieve the said success probability. We also consider the multi-agent extensions of these variants. While the first variant fits mostly product procurement applications, the two latter variants fit well into applications of robots engaged in remote exploration, operating with a limited amount of battery power (i.e., a budget).
Summary of results
We first consider the single agent case. We prove that in general metric spaces all three problem variants are NP-hard. Thus, as mentioned, we focus on the setting where all locations are located along a path. For this setting we provide polynomial algorithms for the Min-Expected-Cost problem. We show the other two problems (Min-Budget and Max-Probability) to be NP-complete even for the path. Thus, we consider further restrictions and also provide an approximation scheme. We show that both problems are polynomial if the number of possible prices is constant. Even with this restriction, we show that these problems are NP-complete on a tree graph. For the Min-Budget problem, we provide an FPTAS (fully-polynomialtime-approximation-scheme), that provides a (1 + ) approximation for any > 0, in time O (poly(n −1 )), where n is the size of the input.
For the multi-agent case, we first analyze a shared budget model, where all the resources and costs are shared among all the agents. We show that if the number of agents is fixed, then all of the single-agent algorithms extend to k-agents, with the time bounds growing exponentially in k. Therefore the computation of the agents' strategies can be performed whenever the number of agents is relatively moderate, a common scenario in many physical environments where several agents cooperate in exploration and search. If the number of agents is part of the input then the multi-agent versions of Min-Budget and Max-Probability are NP-complete even on the path and even with a single price.
We then investigate a model of private budgets, where each agent has its own initial budget. We again assume that the number of possible prices is bounded. In this case, we separately consider the setting where agents can communicate and the setting where they cannot. For non-communicating agents we show a polynomial algorithm for the Max-Probability Table 1 Summary of results: n is the input size, m -the number of points (store locations), d -the number of different possible prices, w.p. (with phone) -the version of Min-Expected-Cost with the ability to purchase by phone (see Section 1.3),d = d + 1, k -the number of agents, n/a -the problem was not defined in that case or there is no need for a solution, f -the polynomial function which is defined in Lemma 22.
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problem that is suitable for any number of agents. For the Min-Budget problem with non-communicating agents, we present a polynomial algorithm for the case that all agents must be allotted identical resources, but show that the problem is NPhard for the general case (unless the number of agents is fixed). Next we consider agents that can communicate, and can call upon each other for assistance. As noted above, in this case the scheduling of the different agents' moves must also to be carefully planned. We present polynomial algorithms for both the Max-Probability problem and the Min-Budget problem that work for any constant number of agents (but become non-polynomial when the number of agents is not constant). We then move to the self-interested agents setting, where the agents seek to obtain an item but each one of them tries to minimize the use of its own private budget for traveling. We define two games, a sequential game, Min-Expected-Cost-Game, and simultaneous game, Min-Budget-Game. We show that when the number of possible prices is bounded and the number of agents is fixed, the strategy that maximizes the social welfare can be found in polynomial time. We also show that in Min-Budget-Game this strategy is a Nash equilibrium, but this is not always the case in Min-Expected-Cost-Game. We thus present a polynomial algorithm that guarantees finding a strategy which is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show an upper bound on the algorithm's performance, and prove that it is tight.
Finally, we extend our results to the case of heterogeneous agents with different capabilities, and discuss the assumptions that we made throughout the paper. Table 1 presents a summary of the results. Empty entries represent open problems.
Related work
Models of a single agent search process with prior probabilistic knowledge have attracted the attention of many researchers in various areas, mainly in economics and operational research, prompting several reviews over the years [40, 42] . These search models have developed to a point where their total contribution is referred to as search theory. Probably the most famous problem within this field is the "secretary problem", which has a remarkably long list of articles that have been dedicated to its variations (see [22] for an extensive bibliography). 2 Nevertheless, these economic-based search models, as well as their extensions over the years into multi-agent environments [35, 46, 36, 48] , assume that the cost associated with observing a given opportunity is stationary (i.e., does not change along the search process). While this permissive assumption facilitates the analysis of search models, it frequently does not capture the real situation in the physical world, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the cost associated with observing a given opportunity may change along the search process. The use of changing search costs suggests an optimal search strategy structure different from the one used in traditional economic search models; other than merely deciding when to terminate its search, the agent also needs to integrate exploration sequence considerations into its decision process. An example of how the cost associated with observing a given opportunity may change along the search process. When the agent is located at u 3 , the cost of observing the prices at u 2 and u 5 are 5 and 9, respectively. When the agent moves to u 4 , the cost of observing the prices at u 2 and u 5 become 10 and 5, respectively.
Search with changing search costs has been previously considered in the computer science domain in the contexts of prize-collecting traveling salesman problems [9] , the orienteering problem [55] and the graph searching problem [39] .
In Prize-Collecting Traveling Salesman Problems (PC-TSP) we are given a graph with non-negative "prize" values associated with each node, and a salesman needs to pick a subset of the nodes to visit in order to minimize the total distance traveled while maximizing the total prize collected. Since there is a tradeoff between the cost of a tour and how much prize it spans, several variants have been developed. All the variants of PC-TSP are NP-hard, as they are generalizations of the famous Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). One variant of PC-TSP is the k-TSP, where every node has a prize of one and the goal is to minimize the total distance traveled, while visiting at least k nodes. Over the years, several constant-factor approximations have been developed for the k-TSP [5, 28, 16, 8, 29] . The Orienteering Problem (OP) is another well-studied variant of PC-TSP, where the goal is to maximize the total prize collected, while keeping the distance traveled below a certain threshold. Several stochastic variants of the OP have been considered. Campbell et al. [17] investigated the Orienteering Problem with Stochastic Travel and Service times (OPSTS). Another stochastic variant of OP is the Orienteering Problem with Stochastic Profits (OPSP) [34] .
These variants of the TSP and OP, while related, fundamentally differ from our model in that the traveling budget and the prizes in these models are distinct, with different "currencies". Thus, using up travel budget does not, and cannot affect the prize collected at a node. In our work, in contrast, traveling and buying use the same resource (e.g. battery power). This fundamental difference is perhaps best exemplified when considering the situation on a path. On the path, solving the TSP, PC-TSP, OP and OPSP is trivial, while, as we show, two of the problems we consider remain NP (and none seems totally trivial). As such, also the methods developed for solving PC-TSP and OP variants, which focus on more general metric spaces, are less relevant to our problem, which focuses on the path metric.
In the Graph Searching Problem (GSP), an agent seeks a single item that resides at some node of a graph, and a distribution is defined over the probabilities of finding the item at each node of the graph. The goal is to minimize the expected cost, as in our Min-Expected-Cost problem. The GSP was shown to be strictly related to a classic well-studied problem, the Minimum Latency Problem (MLP) [47] , also called the traveling repairman problem [1] , the school-bus driver problem [59] , and the delivery man problem [23, 43] . In this problem an agent is supposed to visit the nodes of a graph in a way that minimizes the sum of the latencies to the nodes, where the latency of a node is the distance traveled by the agent before visiting the node. The minimum latency problem was shown to be NP-complete even when the metric space is induced by a tree [51] , but can be solved in linear time when the underlying graph is a path [1, 27] . In the operations research community, there are several exact exponential time algorithms for the MLP, e.g. [61, 23, 50, 14, 41] . Researchers have also evaluated various heuristic approaches [58, 56] . In the computer science community, there is a large branch of research dealing with approximate solutions to the MLP. For general metrics, Blum et al. [15] gave the first constant factor approximation. This was improved by Goemans and Kleinberg [30] , and later by Chaudhuri et al. [18] . Koutsoupias et al. [39] provided a constant factor approximation for the unweighted case (i.e. for a shortest path metric on an unweighted graph), and Arora and Karakostas [4] gave a quasi-polynomial O (n O (log n) ) time approximation scheme for weighted trees and points in R d .
The MLP was also generalized to multi-agent settings (with k repairmen) by Fakcharoenphol et al. [20, 21] . Koutsoupias et al. [39] and later Ausiello et al. [7] showed how to extend results obtained for the MLP to the GSP. For example, in some cases, approximation developed for the MLP can be applied to the GSP. Extensions of the GSP to scenarios where the item is mobile are of the same character [26, 38] . The GSP models fundamentally differ from our model in that in GSP there is a single item located somewhere in the graph, which needs to be found, and thus a single binary probability at each node. In our model, the item may be simultaneously available at many nodes, but at different prices, and the for each node there is a distribution over the multiple prices (as in economic search theory). Additionally, in our model traveling and purchasing consume the same resource, an element lacking from the GSP model. This paper thus tries to bridge the gap between classical economic search theory (which is mainly suitable for virtual or non-dimensional worlds) and the changing search cost constraint imposed by operating in physical multi-agent environments.
From a broad perspective, our search problems lay within the field of planning under uncertainty. Some of the important and relevant models in this field are Markov Decision Process (MDP) [12, 45] , Decentralized Markov Decision Process (DEC-MDP) [13] and Stochastic Games [49] . In all of these models (Stochastic Games being the most general, MDP is the most restricted) the goal is to maximize expected cumulative reward over a finite or infinite number of steps. This is the objective with the Min-Expected-Cost problem, and we indeed use an MDP formulation to solve the Min-Expected-Cost problem on the path (see Section 2.1.2). The other two problems we consider are not concerned with expected rewards, and hence the MDP formulations, and variants, are inapplicable.
There are also other fields in AI (and in general) that consider problems which are closely related to our problems. One such field is the work in path planning when there is uncertain knowledge about the environment. In these settings the agent reveals the traversability of the edges only upon reaching them. The Focused Dynamic A * (D * ) algorithm [53] is the most popular heuristic search method that repeatedly determines a shortest path from the agent's current position to the goal, and is able to replan quickly as the knowledge of the terrain changes. Consequent alternatives to D * are D * lite [37] and DSA * [54] , which are also able to handle the case where the goal changes over time in addition to the traversability of edges. Unlike our model, in this line of work there are neither uncertainties regarding values nor costs at the possible goal locations that need to be considered. Therefore, D * lite and DSA* algorithms cannot be used to solve our problem.
Another related line of work is scheduling, and in particular scheduling under uncertainty, which considers similar types of objectives [10, 11, 24] . Much research has been carried out in this field (see [33] for a survey), considering the problem of optimal allocation of resources to activities over time, where some of the parameters are uncertain. Our problems can also be seen as a scheduling problem, as we assign the agents to visit different stores over time. However, in the scheduling domain the chosen plan does not affect the way that the uncertain parameters (i.e., the processing time or the job length) are determined. In our case, the cost of visiting each store (i.e., the processing time) and the probability of buying there (i.e., the probability distribution over the job length) depends on the selected plan. Moreover, in many scheduling under uncertainty problem formulations the underlying deterministic problem is itself NP-hard, and research focus is on developing heuristics to cope with the probabilistic version of the problem. In our case there is no underlying deterministic problem -if all the prices are known, Min-Budget and Max-Probability are not defined and Min-Expected-Cost has a trivial solution. In addition, we concentrate in analyzing the cases where there is an exact polynomial solution or at least a proven approximation (with guarantees on the distance from the optimal solution).
Terminology and definitions
We are provided with a set of m points -S = {u 1 , . . . , u m }, which represent the locations where the item may be available, which we call stores, together with a distance function dis : S × S → R + , which determines the travel costs between any two locations. 3 We are also provided with the agents' initial locations, which are assumed WLOG (without loss of generality) to be at one of the stores (the product's price at this store may be ∞). With a single agent, there is one initial location, u s ; with k agents we are provided with a vector of initial locations (u (1) 
In addition, we are provided with a cost probability function p i (c) -stating the probability that the cost of obtaining the item at store i is c. Let D be the set of distinct prices with non-zero probability, and d = |D|. We assume that the actual price at a store is only revealed once an agent reaches the store. Given these inputs, the goal is roughly to obtain the product at the minimal total cost, including both travel costs and purchase price. Since we are dealing with probabilities, this rough goal can be interpreted in three different concrete formulations:
1. Min-Expected-Cost: minimize the expected cost of obtaining the product. 2. Min-Budget: given a success probability p succ minimize the budget necessary to guarantee obtaining the product with probability at least p succ . 3. Max-Probability: given a total budget B, maximize the probability of obtaining the product.
In all the above problems, the optimization problem entails determining the strategy (order) in which to visit the different stores, and when to terminate the search. In Min-Budget and Max-Probability, the search is always terminated when the product is available for a price no greater than the remaining budget, and the agent is located at the store where the product is purchased. In Min-Expected-Cost the budget is not allocated in advance and therefore the agent may decide to buy the product at one store even when currently located at a different store. In this case, the agent will have to return to the specific store, thus paying the "return" costs. This model (which includes returning costs) is the basic Min-Expected-Cost model we consider. In addition, following standard assumption in economic search literature, we also consider a model in which there are no returning costs. In a physical environment this can be justified if the product can be purchased by phone (following the first physical visit at the store). We analyze both variants of the problem, and refer to them as Min-Expected-Cost and Min-Expected-Cost phone problems, respectively.
Technically, it is sometimes easier to work with the failure probability instead of the success probability. In order to compute the failure probability there is a need to only multiply the failure probabilities in each node that has been visited. For the success probability, one needs to use addition and multiplication. Therefore, instead of maximizing p succ we may phrase our objective as minimizing the failure probability.
Single agent
We start by analyzing the single agent case, for general distance functions (e.g. the stores are located in a general metric space). Unfortunately, in these settings, all three of the above mentioned problems are NP-hard; Min-Budget and Max-Probability remain hard even if the metric space is a tree. Thus, we focus on the case that the stores are all located on a single path. We would like to emphasize that even in a general metric spaces the stores are along some path that can be traced through them. However, the agent can freely move from every store to every other store directly (with an associated travel cost). When we say that the stores are located on a path we mean that the agent's movement is more restricted -if the agent is located in a store it can move directly only to the two adjacent neighbors of its current location. We denote these problems Min-Budget (path), Max-Probability (path), and Min-Expected-Cost (path), respectively. In this case we can assume that, WLOG all points are on the line, and do away with the distance function dis. Rather, the distance between u i and u j is simply |u i − u j |. Furthermore, WLOG we may assume that the stores are ordered from left-to-right, i.e. u 1 < u 2 < · · · < u m . For exposition purposes, the analysis throughout the paper includes only sketch of proofs for hardness.
The detailed proofs are given in Appendices A and B.
Minimize-Expected-Cost
We prove that the Min-Expected-Cost variant is hard for general metric spaces. To prove this we first convert the problem into its decision version. In Min-Expected-Cost-Decide we are given a set of points S, a distance function dis : S × S → R + , an agent's initial location u s , a price-probability function p · (·), and a maximum expected cost M. The problem is to decide whether there is a policy to obtain the product with an expected cost of at most M.
Hardness in general metric spaces
Theorem 1. For general metric spaces Min-Expected-Cost-Decide is NP-hard.
The reduction used is from Hamiltonian path, and we build the instance in such a way that the agent needs to visit all the stores, but only once, to obtain the product with the target expected cost.
We note that in the proof the number of possible prices, d, does not depend on the input. Thus, for general metric spaces Min-Expected-Cost-Decide is hard even if d is bounded. Furthermore, even if we assume that an agent can purchase the product by phone after leaving the store, Min-Expected-Cost-Decide is still hard (the proof is essentially identical, except that we remove the returning cost of 2n from M).
Before continuing with the analysis, we point out that if the cost of arriving to a location is fixed (e.g., in a virtual environment, such as e-commerce, where the cost of visiting each store does not depend on the last visited store), Min-Expected-Cost can be solved in polynomial time. The optimal search strategy in this case, as proved by Weitzman [57] , is based on setting a reservation value (i.e., a threshold) to each store according to the distribution characterizing its value and the cost of revealing that value. The searcher should continue the search as long as the best value obtained so far is above the lowest reservation value among those associated with stores that have not been explored yet. Formally, the reservation value R i of a store associated with a fixed cost F c i and a distribution p i (c) can be extracted from the following equation:
Intuitively, R i is the value where the searcher is precisely indifferent: the expected marginal benefit from revealing the actual value of a store (right-hand side) exactly equals the cost of doing so (left-hand side). The use of variable exploration costs due to physical constraints that need to be factored in thus dramatically increases the complexity of determining the agents' optimal strategies, precluding simple solutions such as the above. Note that on the path, at any point in time the points/stores visited by the agent constitute a contiguous interval, which we call the visited interval. Clearly, the algorithm need only make decisions at store locations. Furthermore, decisions can be limited to times when the agent is at one of the two stores at the edges of the visited interval. At each such location, the agent has only three possible actions: "go right" -extending the visited-interval one store to the right, "go left" -extending the visited-interval one store to the left, or "stop" -stopping the search and buying the product by phone at the best price so far. Also note that after the agent has already visited the interval [u , u r ], how exactly it covered this interval does not matter for any future decision; the costs have already been incurred. Accordingly, the states of the MDP are quadruplets
[ , r, e, c], such that s r, e ∈ { , r}, and c ∈ D, representing the situation that the agents visited stores u through u r , it is currently at location u e , and the best price encountered so far is c. The terminal states are Buy(c) and all states of the form [1, m, e, c] , and the terminal cost is c. For all other states there are two or three possible actions -"go right" (provided that r < m), "go left" (provided that 1 < ), or "stop". Transition to all other states has zero probability. Transitions for the "go left" action are analogous. Given the state [ , r, e, c] and the action "stop", there is probability 1 to transition to state Buy(c). This fully defines the MDP. The optimal strategy for finite-horizon MDPs can be determined using dynamic programming (see [45, Ch. 4] ). In our case, the number of entries in the dynamic programming table is at most m · m · 2 · d (since this is an upper bound on the number of possible states) and it takes at most O (d) steps to compute each entry. Therefore, the complexity of solving
Min-Expected-Cost
For Min-Expected-Cost (no phone) we will need a larger MDP, but the basic structure is similar. First note that if an interval [u , u r ] has been visited, and the item not yet purchased, then any future purchase within the interval (if there should be such a purchase) will be with the agent coming from outside the interval into the interval, and moving directly to a store for purchasing. In addition, there is a unique store u x r , such that any searcher coming from anywhere to the right of u r and purchasing within [u , u r ] purchases at u x r , and similarly a unique store u x , for purchases coming from the left of u . The reason is that the cost of purchasing at a store is the sum of price and distance. So, any fixed additional distance does not change the minimum. Thus, if the price at u x r is lowest for someone coming from u r , it is also the minimum for anyone coming from u r to the right of u r . Therefore, the states of the MDP for Min-Expected-Cost are septuplets [ , r, e, c , x , c r , x r ], representing the situation that the agent visited stores u through u r , it is currently at location u e , e ∈ { , r}, and the best price encountered so far for someone coming from the left (respectively right) is c (c r ), which can be found at store u x (u x r ). 
Min-Budget and Max-Probability
NP completeness
Unlike the Min-Expected-Cost problem, the other two problems are NP-complete even on a path. To prove this we again convert the problems into their decision versions. In the Min-Budget-Decide problem, we are given a set of points S, a distance function dis : S × S → R + , an agent's initial location u s , a price-probability function p · (·), a minimum success probability p succ and maximum budget B. We have to decide whether a success probability of at least p succ can be obtained with a budget of at most B. The exact same formulation also constitutes the decision version of the Max-Probability problem.
Theorem 2. The Min-Budget-Decide problem is NP-complete even on a path.
The reduction is from 0-1 Knapsack. We build the instance such that the agent needs to go back and forth along the line in a zigzag movement. Before any direction switch the agent needs to decide weather to keep moving to a close store, to "collect" some more probabilities, or to keep its budget and head to the other direction. Each such decision corresponds to the decision of whether to spend some space and insert an item to the knapsack, or save it to the next item.
Thus, we either need to consider restricted instances or consider approximations. We do both.
Restricted case: Bounded number of prices
We consider the restricted case when the number of possible prices, d, is bounded. For brevity, we focus on the Min-Budget (path) problem. The same algorithm and similar analysis work also for the Max-Probability (path) problem. Consider first the case where there is only one possible price c 0 . At any store i, either the product is available at this price, with probability p i = p i (c 0 ), or not available at any price. In this setting we show that the problem can be solved in O (m)
steps. This is based on the following lemma, stating that in this case, at most one direction change is necessary. requires the lowest budget but still has a success probability of at least p succ . With a little more care, the complexity can be reduced to O (m). First note that since there is only a single price c 0 , we can add c 0 to the budget at the end, and assume that the product will be provided at stores for free, provided that it is available. Now, consider the strategy of first moving right and then switching to the left. In this case, we need only consider the minimal intervals that provide the desired success probability, and for each compute the necessary budget. This can be performed incrementally, in a total of O (m)
operations for all such minimal intervals, since at most one point can be added and one deleted at any given time. Similarly for the strategy of first moving left and then switching to the right. The details are provided in Algorithm 1. Next, consider the case that there may be several different available prices, but their number, d, is fixed. We provide a polynomial algorithm for this case (though exponential in d). First note that in the Min-Budget problem, we seek to minimize the initial budget B necessary so as to guarantee a success probability of at least p succ given this initial budget. Once the budget has been allocated, however, there is no requirement to minimize the actual expenditure. Thus, at any store, if the product is available for a price no greater than the remaining budget, it is purchased immediately and the search is over. If the product has a price beyond the current available budget, the product will not be purchased at this store under any Proof. The areas i fully determine the success probability of the strategy. Any strategy other than the ones specified in the lemma would require more travel budget, without enlarging any i . 2
Thus, the optimal strategy is fully determined by the leftmost and rightmost points of each i , together with the choice for the ending points of covering each area. We can thus consider all possible cases and choose the one with the lowest budget which provides the necessary success probability. 
prices.
In summary, the effect of bounding the number of prices was indeed surprising. Indeed, as we showed in Lemma 4, the number of prices determines incremental intervals for covering by the agent. Each price induces only one interval and there are only two optimal ways to cover each interval. Therefore, if the number of prices is fixed, even if we increase the number of stores we can still enumerate and check all the possible ways to cover the intervals optimally. Unfortunately, moving beyond the path, Min-Budget-Decide turns hard, even with a bounded number of possible prices, and even on a tree.
Theorem 6. The Min-Budget-Decide problem is NP-complete on a tree, even with a bounded number of prices.
The reduction is from 0-1 Knapsack. In the proof we build a star tree, where the agent is located at the root and all the other stores around him. We use only two possible prices, 0 and inf, so the only difference between stores is their distance from the root (which corresponds to the knapsack items size) and the probability of purchasing the product (which corresponds to the knapsack item value).
Min-Budget approximation
Next, we provide an FPTAS (fully-polynomial-time-approximation-scheme) for the Min-Budget (path) problem. The idea is to force the agent to move in quantum steps of some fixed size δ. In this case the tour taken by the agent can be divided into segments, each of size δ. Furthermore, the agent's decision points are restricted to the ends of these segments, except
for the case where along the way the agent has sufficient budget to purchase the product at a store, in which case it does so and stops. We call such a movement of the agent a δ-resolution tour. Note that the larger δ the less decision points there are, and the complexity of the problem decreases. Given 0 < < 1, we show that with a proper choice of δ we can guarantee a (1 + ) approximation to the optimum, while maintaining a complexity of O (n poly(1/ )), where n is the size of the input.
Our algorithm is based on computing for (essentially) each initial possible budget B, the maximal achievable success probability, and then pick the minimum budget with probability at least p succ . Note that once the interval [ , r] has been covered without purchasing the product, the only information that matters for any future decision is (i) the remaining budget, and (ii) the current location. The exact (fruitless) way in which this interval was covered is, at this point, immaterial. This, "memoryless" nature calls, again, for a dynamic programming approach. We now provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the optimal δ-resolution tour. WLOG assume that u s = 0 (the initial location is at the origin). For integral i, let w i = iδ. The points w i , which we call the resolution points, are the only decision points for the algorithm. 
Similarly, the least failure probability obtainable by a decision to move left (to w −1 ) is: Consider a success probability p succ and suppose that optimally this success probability can be obtained with budget B opt using the tour T opt . By tour we mean a list of actions ("right", "left" or "stop") at each decision point (which, in this case, are all store locations). We convert T opt to a δ-resolution tour, T δ opt , as follows. For any i 0, when T opt moves for the first time to the right of w i then T δ opt moves all the way to w i+1 . Similarly, for i 0, when T opt moves for the first time to the left of w i then T δ opt moves all the way to w i−1 .
Note that T δ opt requires additional travel costs only when it "overshoots", i.e. when it goes all the way to the resolution point while T opt would not. This can either happen (i) in the last step, or (ii) when T opt makes a direction change. Type (i) can happen only once and costs at most δ. Type opt is a δ-resolution tour that with budget at most B opt + (2t + 1)δ succeeds with probability p succ . Hence, our dynamic algorithm, which finds the optimal such δ-resolution tour will find a tour with budget B δ opt B opt + (2t + 2)δ obtaining at least the same success probability. Note that we include one additional δ, for the integral multiples of δ in the tables.
Since T δ opt has t-turns, T opt must also have t-turns, with targets at t distinct resolution segments. For any i, the i-th such turn (of T opt ) necessarily means that T opt moves to a point at least (i − 1) segments away, i.e. a distance of at least (i − 1)δ.
Thus, for B opt , which is at least the travel cost of T opt , we have 4 :
On the other hand, since we consider all options for δ in multiples of 2, there must be aδ such that:
Combining (2) and (3) we get that t 2λ −1 . Thus, the approximation ratio is:
Also, combining (3) and (5) 
Multi-agent, shared budget
Since even the single agent case is hard for general metric spaces, with the multi-agent case we focus solely on situations in which all the stores are on a single path. We assume k agents operating in the same underlying physical setting as in the single agent case, i.e. a set of stores S and a price probability function for each store. We assume that the goal is not individualized; the agents seek to obtain only one item and having multiple goods is not beneficial. Furthermore, since the agents are fully collaborative, they do not care which agent will obtain the item.
We begin by analyzing the shared budget multi-agent model, where all the resources and costs are shared among all the agents. In theory, agents may move in parallel, but since minimizing time is not an objective, we may assume WLOG that at any given time only one agent moves. When an agent reaches a store and finds the price at this location, the optimal strategy should tell whether to purchase the product (and where) and if not what agent should move next and to where. Therefore, in the k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost problem the agents try to minimize the expected total cost, which includes the travel costs of all agents plus the final purchase price (which is one of the prices that the agents have sampled). In k-Shared-Min-Budget and k-Shared-Max-Probability, the initial budget is for the use of all the agents, and the success probability is for any of the agents to purchase, at any location. Since all the agents use the same budget in this model, inter alia, for traveling costs, we assume the agents can communicate with each other to coordinate their moves. In k-Shared-Min-Budget and k-Shared-Max-Probability the agents only need to announce to the other agents when they reach a specific store. In k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost the agents also need to communicate the price they find at the location they have reached.
In general, the algorithms for the single-agent case (for the path) can be extended to the multi-agent case, with the additional complexity of coordinating between the agents. The proofs are relegated to Appendix B, as they are very similar to the single agent case. We obtain: 
steps (for an arbitrary number of prices).
While the complexity in the multi-agent case grows exponentially in the number of agents, in most physical environments where several agents cooperate in exploration and search, the number of agents is relatively moderate. In these cases the computation of the agents' strategies is efficiently facilitated by the principles of the algorithmic approach presented in this paper.
If the number of agents is not fixed (i.e. part of the input) then, the complexity of all three variants grows exponentially. Most striking perhaps is that k-Shared-Min-Budget and k-Shared-Max-Probability are NP-complete even on the path with a single price. This is in contrast to the single agent case where the single price case can be solved in O (n) steps. To prove this we again formulate the problems into a decision version -k-Shared-Min-Budget-Decide -given a set of points S on the path, initial locations for all agents (u
s ), a price-probability function p · (·), a minimum success probability p succ and a maximum budget B, decide if success probability of at least p succ can be achieved with a maximum budget B.
Theorem 11. k-Shared-Min-Budget-Decide is NP-complete even on the path with a single price.
The reduction is (again) from 0-1 Knapsack. We build the instance such that the number of agents corresponds to the number of possible knapsack items. Each agent can only visit one store, since we set the distances to the other stores above the (shared) budget. As before, the probabilities at the stores correspond to the knapsack items values, and the distances correspond to the knapsack items sizes. The problem is to decide which agents will move given the initial budget, which corresponds to the decision which items to insert to the knapsack given its size.
Multi-agent, private budget
We now investigate a model of private budgets, wherein each agent j has its own initial budget B j (unlike the previous shared budget model). If the objective is to minimize the total expected cost, the private budgets model is equal to the shared budget model since the agents are cooperative. Therefore in this case we have two concrete problem formulations:
1. k-Private-Max-Probability: given initial budgets B j , for each agent j, maximize the probability of obtaining the item. 2. k-Private-Min-Budget: given a target success probability p succ , minimize the agents' initial budgets necessary to guarantee acquisition of the item with a probability of at least p succ .
Since the corresponding single-agent problems are hard even for the path, we again assume that the number of possible prices, d, is bounded. In the k-Private-Min-Budget problem it is also important to distinguish between two different agent models:
• Identical budgets: the initial budgets of all the agents must be the same. The problem is to minimize this initial budget, and we denote the problem as k-Private-Min-Budget identical .
• Distinct: the agents' initial budgets may be different. In this case the problem is to minimize the average initial budget, and we denote the problem as k-Private-Min-Budget distinct .
Non-communicating agents
We first consider the case where agents cannot communicate with each other. In this case agents cannot assist each other. Hence a solution is a strategy comprised of a set of ordered lists, one for each agent, determining the sequence of stores this agent must visit.
The success probability of a strategy is the probability that at least one of the agents will succeed in its task. Technically, in this case, it is easier to calculate the complementary failure probability: the probability that all the agents will not succeed in their tasks. For example, suppose that the stores and agents are located as illustrated in Fig. 2 , and consider the depicted strategy. This strategy fails if for both agents and each of the stores they visit the cost of the item is higher than their remaining budget. This will happen with probability (
. Hence, the success probability of this strategy is 19 20 . We begin by considering the k-Private-Max-Probability problem. We prove: The proof is based on the following definitions and lemmata. The key idea is that in most cases the stores will be visited by only one agent in the optimal strategy. However, there are some cases where the same store will be visited by more than one agent. We identify these cases and show that there are only a fixed number of them. We are thus able to provide a dynamic programming algorithm to find the optimal strategy.
Note that multiple strategies may result in the same success probability. In this case we say that the strategies are equivalent. In particular there may be more than one optimal strategy. Definition 13. Let S be a strategy. Agents i andī are said to be separated by S if each store that is reached by i is not reached byī.
Lemma 14.
If agents i andī are not separated by any optimal strategy, then in at least one optimal strategy at least one of these agents must pass the initial location of the other.
Proof. WLOG assume that i is on the right side ofī. Consider an optimal strategy S. Let r be the rightmost store that is reached by i andl the leftmost store that is reached byī. Assume by contradiction that none of the agents passes the initial location of the other in S. Thus, there is at least one store between their initial locations that is reached by both agents. WLOG assume thatī reaches at least one store with a higher budget than i's remaining budget when reaching it, and denote byr * the rightmost such store. Consider the following modified strategy: i goes according to S till the stage it has to reachr * . If i did not reach r yet then instead of reachingr * it goes all the way straight to r. Otherwise, it stops just before reachingr * .ī goes according to S till the stage it has to reachr * . Ifī did not reachl yet then after reachingr * it goes all the way straight tol. Otherwise, it stops after reachingr * . Agents i andī are separated by this strategy and it has at least the same success probability as S, in contradiction. 2
Based on this lemma, we now show that if two agents are not separated by any optimal policy, their movement has a specific structure. • Either i orī does not move. First we show that we may assume thatī reaches at least one store outside the interval [l, r] . If it does not, consider the following two cases. If i's remaining budget at each store is always as high asī's remaining budget thenī does not have to move and the theorem holds. Otherwise, letr * be the rightmost store whereī's remaining budget is higher than i's remaining budget. Ifr * is on the left side of i's initial location, then as in the proof of Lemma 14, the agents can be separated. Ifr * is on the right side of i's initial location and it equals r, there is no need for i to reach r since at each store
Proof. WLOG assume that
,ī has at least the same budget as i. Thus, there is an optimal strategy where either i does not move or it moves only to the left, soī passes the rightmost store that is reached by i. Ifr * is on the right side of i but on the left side of r then there is no need forī to go beyondr * . Since it has more budget than i at this location,ī can move to l while i moves to r. Thus, again, there is an optimal strategy where either i does not move or it moves only to the right, soī passes the leftmost store that is reached by i. Thus, we may assume thatī reaches at least one store outside the interval [l, r].
WLOG assume that i's final movement's direction is left and suppose thatī reaches at least one store outside the interval [l, r] to the left of l. Ifī's budget at l is higher than i's remaining budget there, then it is also higher at u (ī) s , and again the agents can be separated. Ifī's budget at l is not higher than i's remaining budget, thenī does not have to move since i can reach the same stores to the left of l.
Now suppose thatī moves to the right (which is the opposite direction of i's final movement) and passes u (i)
s , but it also changes its direction. The only reason forī to change directions is to reach a store on the left side of its initial location, with a higher budget than i has at this store, or to reach a store that i does not reach at all. In both casesī must reach each store in [l, u (i) s ] with at least the same budget as i has at the same location, so either S is not optimal, or we can modify S by letting onlyī to move while i does not move at all. 2
Using these lemmata we observe that for any two agents, there is only a constant number of possible cases where the agents are not separated by the optimal strategies. Fig. 3 illustrates the three core cases (the others are symmetrical). Here, agents 1 and 3 are non-separated agents. Note that every agent between them, like agent 2, does not have to move at all in the optimal strategy.
Therefore we can use a dynamic programming approach to find an optimal strategy whereby all the agents are separated, but we also check the non-separated strategies individually.
Recall that in our problem the objective is to maximize the success probability, given the initial budgets. Technically, it is easy to work with the failure probability instead of the success probability. s . In this case, in the optimal strategy¯j may move in both directions, or not move at all. Let u (j) l be the leftmost store visited by¯j with the optimal strategy for this interval, and agent l is the one such that
. First note that each agent t, t l, and¯j are separated by the optimal policy, or¯j does not move. Otherwise, according to Lemma 14 t must pass the initial location of¯j but according to Lemma 15¯j must reach a store outside the
s ] which does not occur. Since¯j passes the initial locations of every agent t, l < t <j, if one of them moves it goes only in the opposite direction of the final movement direction of¯j according to Lemma 15, and as illustrated in Fig. 3 . Since they all must move in the same direction, according to the same lemma at most one of them moves in the optimal policy. Therefore, to compute act[u¯i,¯j] we check only the following options, and choose the best one: , l], with the optimal movement of agent
The previous two options assume that¯j and every other agent are separated. Otherwise:
One agent t, l < t <j, moves. Let u (t)
l be the leftmost store visited by either agent t or¯j, with the optimal strategy, and agent l is the one such that u
, l], with the optimal movement of the two agents¯j and t in the interval [u Proof. By Theorem 12, given a budgetB, we can calculate the maximum achievable success probability. Thus we can run a binary search over the possible values ofB to find the minimal one that still guarantees a success probability p succ . The maximum required budget is 2 · |u 1 − u m | + max D, which is part of the input. Thus the binary search will require a polynomial number of steps. 2 Surprisingly, the results for k-Private-Min-Budget distinct are different. We note that in the k-Private-Min-Budget distinct problem the objective is to minimize the average budget, which is the same as minimizing the total budget. Therefore, if the number of agents is fixed, we can use the same polynomial time algorithm that is used in the proof of Theorem 9 (except that the visited intervals of the agents are not disjoint). If the number of agents is a parameter, the hardness of k-Private-Min-Budget distinct follows from that of the k-Shared-Min-Budget problem. We obtain:
Theorem 18. If the number of agents is fixed, k-Private-Min-Budget distinct with no communication can be solved in O (m2
kd ( em 2d ) 2kd ).
If the number of agents is a parameter, k-Private-Min-Budget distinct with no communication is NP-complete even for a single possible
cost.
Communicating agents
Once communication is added agents can call upon each other for assistance and the relative scheduling of the agents' moves must also be considered. In this case a solution is an ordered list of moves, where each move is a pair stating an agent and its next destination.
The success probability of a solution is now calculated according to the order of moves. For example, suppose that the stores and agents are located as illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Consider the following solution: agent 2 first goes to u 4 and then agent 1 goes to u 2 . Agent 2 is the only one which can succeed at u 4 , with a probability of 0.8. With probability of 0.2 it will not succeed and agent 1 has a probability of 0.2 to succeed at u 2 . Hence, the success probability is 0.8 + 0.2 · 0.2 = 0.84. If we switch the order of the moves we get a probability of 0.9 to succeed at u 2 with the first move, since agent 2 will be called for assistance if the cost required is less than 100. If not, agent 2 will move to u 4 as before. Hence, this solution success probability is 0.9 + 0.1 · 0.8 = 0.98.
When the number of agents is not fixed, k-Private-Max-Probability, k-Private-Min-Budget
identical and k-Private-MinBudget distinct are not known to be solvable in polynomial time. However, in many physical environments where several agents cooperate in exploration and search, the number of agents is relatively small. In this case we can show that all the three problems can be solved in polynomial time. We show:
Theorem 19. In the setting of communicating agents, if the number of agents and the number of different costs is fixed then
k-Private-Max-Probability, k-Private-Min-Budget identical and k-Private-Min-Budget distinct can be solved in polynomial time.
For brevity, we focus on the k-Private-Max-Probability problem. The same algorithm and similar analysis work also for the other two problems.
First note that as in Max-Probability, in k-Private-Max-Probability we need to maximize the probability of obtaining the item given the initial budgets B i , but there is no requirement to minimize the actual resources consumed (in contrast to k-Shared-Max-Probability). Thus, at any store, if agents can obtain the item for a cost no greater than its remaining budget, the search is over. Furthermore, if the cost is beyond the agent's available budget, but there is another agent with a sufficient budget to both travel from its current location and to obtain the item, then this agent is called upon and the search is also over. Otherwise, the item will not be obtained at this store under any circumstances. Thus, the basic strategy structure, which determines which agent goes where, remains the same. Unless the search has to be terminated, the decision of one agent where to go next is not affected by the knowledge gained by others. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 9, we get the following result. For brevity, we denoted instead of d + 1. ( j)
. Thus, consider for each agent the incremental area covered when its remaining budget is c i but less than c i−1 ,
(with
is a union of an interval at left of u It thus remains to consider the scheduling between the moves, i.e. their order. Theoretically, with n moves there are n! different possible orderings. We show, however, that for any given set of moves, we need only to consider a polynomial number of possible orderings.
Consider a given set of moves M, determining the sets • There exists an agent j with budget at least c i 0 such that M mid consists of all the moves of j in
and S mid is the (one possible) order on these moves.
• M post are the remaining moves in M and S post is a cascading order on them.
To visualize this definition, consider the example in Fig. 5 . Given the depicted set of moves, the highest cost that an agent can pay is 60, by agent 2 at u 4 . Therefore, a possible cascading order S can decompose M such that M pre = {agent 3 goes to u 7 Before t 0 all agents in A i 0 have a higher budget than any agent not in A i 0 . Thus, before t 0 agents of A i 0 will never call upon those not in A i 0 . Thus, if we let the agents that are not in A i 0 take their moves first the success probability will not decrease. We can thus allow all of the moves of M pre to be performed first.
Also, before t 0 no agents of A i 0 needs to call upon each other for assistance (since they are all in the same resource bracket). Thus, we may allow them to take their moves independently without decreasing the success probability. In particular, we can allow j to complete its covering of 
Together with Proposition 20 we get that the total number of options to consider is polynomial, proving the k-PrivateMax-Probability part of Theorem 19. The proof for the other two problems is similar.
Self-interested agents
In this section we consider the strategic behavior that may occur when the agents are self-interested. We assume k agents, operate in the same underlying physical setting as in the previous multi-agent case with private budgets, i.e. the stores are all on a single path, the number of possible prices, d, is bounded, and there is a fixed number of agents. However in the self-interested agents setting, the agents seek to obtain the item but do not want to spend their individual budgets on travel costs; we assume the purchase price is equally shared among all the agents. In this case we define two games, a simultaneous game, Min-Budget-Game, and a sequential game, Min-Expected-Cost-Game.
Min-Budget-Game
In the Min-Budget-Game we are given a target success probability p succ , and each agent's objective is to minimize its initial budget necessary to guarantee that the item will be acquired with a probability of at least p succ . To avoid the case where each agent will set its initial budget at zero, we set the utility of not guaranteeing the success probability p succ so low that it will always be worthwhile to attain it. We assume the game is a simultaneous game; the agents can only choose their initial budgets. After this phase, the agents calculate the (collaborative) strategy that will maximize their success probability (given their chosen budgets) and follow it. The only decision point in this game is when an agent needs to choose its budget.
Since the number of agents and the number of different costs is fixed, the optimal solution for k-Private-Min-Budget . Obviously, Opt soc maximizes the social welfare and it can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, Opt soc is also a Nash equilibrium [44, p. 14] . Clearly, for each agent i, there is no incentive to deviate and to choose a budget for itself which is larger than B alg i , since with B alg i the success probability p succ is already guaranteed (assuming the other agents will not deviate). On the other hand, since the algorithm of Theorem 19 is optimal, there is no incentive for each agent i to deviate and choose a budget for itself which is smaller than B alg i , as p succ will not be achieved (recall that the utility of not guaranteeing the success probability is very low). We obtain: Theorem 23. In the Min-Budget-Game, the strategy that maximizes the social welfare, Opt soc , can be found in polynomial time and it is also a Nash equilibrium.
Min-Expected-Cost game
In the Min-Expected-Cost-Game each agent's objective is to minimize its total expected cost. As in the previous game, to avoid the case where each agent will not want to make any move, we set the utility of not obtaining the item so low that it is always worth traveling to at least one store to purchase the product. The Min-Expected-Cost-Game is a sequential game and the rules are as follows. At each time step, only one of the agents is allowed to move to the next store, but it can also decide not to move at all. Then there is a decision phase, where every agent is allowed to buy the product, to opt-out, or to do nothing. If at least one agent decides to buy the product, it is purchased and then the game is over (even if other agents decide to opt-out). No matter how many agents decide to buy the product, only the one with minimal price is purchased. If no agent decides to buy the product and at least one agent decides to opt-out then the game is over without buying the product. Otherwise, the decision phase ends and the game proceeds by allowing the next agent (according to a fixed, pre-defined cyclic order) to move. The pre-defined order of movement phases well-define the game, but it has no essential meaning; the agents have the option not to move during their turns, so actually any order of movements may occur.
In order to find the strategy that will maximize the social welfare, Opt soc , we need to run the algorithm from Theorem 8. In our setting, it will run in polynomial time. However, unlike in the Min-Budget-Game, the solution found cannot be directly translated into a strategy. First, we need to translate the movements. At any stage, if the algorithm for k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost decides that a specific agent should move, for instance agent i, then the strategy for Min-Expected-Cost-Game defines that until it is agent i's turn to move, any other agent will not move during its movement phase, and all the agents will do nothing during the decision phase. We also need to handle the case where one agent does not move according to this strategy. For this purpose, we determine that in any case where one of the agents deviates from its determined policy in the movement phase, the other agents purchase the product during the decision phase that follows. If it is not possible, i.e. the product is not available where the agents are located, the other agents opt-out during the decision phase. The translation of the algorithm's decision to buy is straightforward; the strategy defines that in the corresponding decision phase all the agents decide to buy, and an agent that cannot buy opt-out. We also do not need to handle the case where one agent deviates in a decision phase, since the game will be over in that case. In conclusion, Opt soc , the strategy for Min-Expected-Cost-Game that maximizes the social welfare, can be found in polynomial time using the algorithm from Theorem 8. However, Opt soc is not always a Nash equilibrium, as will be shown in Example 24. For ease of notation, when describing Opt soc or any other strategy we omit the movement and decision phases when the agents do nothing.
Example 24.
Suppose that the stores and agents are located as illustrated in Fig. 6 . The traveling costs between u 2 and u 3 and between u 4 and u 5 are so high, that the only reasonable moves are according to the illustrated arrows. Opt soc for this example is that agent 1 will go to u 2 . If the price is 6 the product will be purchased. Otherwise, agent 3 will go to u 6 and if the price is 6 the product will be purchased. Otherwise, agent 2 will go to u 4 and the product will be purchased at the minimal sampled price (which can be 12 or 27). The expected cost of this strategy is 14.375, but it is not a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, if the product was not purchased after the moves of agents 1 and 3, then the minimal sampled price will be 27. At this stage, if agent 2 deviates and decides not to move, the product will be purchased and the private cost of agent 2 will be 9 (the purchase price is equally shared among all the agents). If agent 2 proceeds according to Opt soc , its expected cost will be 4 + 0.5 · 4 + 0.5 · 9 = 10.5 > 9. Therefore, agent 2 will have an incentive to deviate from Opt soc .
If we switch the movement order of agents 2 and 3, the expected cost will be higher, 15.125, but this strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, agent 1 will not deviate during its turn since the other agents will opt-out. Agent 2 will not deviate during its turn since its private cost will be 10, and if it will follow the strategy its expected cost will be 4 + 0.5 · 4 + 0.5 · (0.5 · 2 + 0.5 · 9) = 8.75 < 10 (assuming the other agents will not deviate). Agent 3 will not deviate during its turn either, since its private cost will be 10, and if it will follow the strategy its expected cost will be 4 + 0.5 · 2 + 0.5 · 9 = 9.5 < 10.
Example 24 demonstrates that Opt soc is not always a Nash equilibrium. We now show a polynomial algorithm that always returns a strategy which is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show an upper bound on the algorithm's performance, and prove that it is tight.
Theorem 25.
There is a polynomial algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium for the Min-Expected-Cost-Game.
Proof. The algorithm works as follows. It divides all the buying costs by k, and then solves the finite-horizon MDP as in the proof of Theorem 8. The solution is then translated into a strategy for the Min-Expected-Cost-Game, in the same way we translated the optimal solution of k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost to Opt soc . We denote this strategy by Opt Nash . Since the pre-process takes O (d) operations the algorithm for finding Opt Nash is polynomial. Any strategy S consists of traveling costs and buying costs, denoted by {t i } and {b i }, respectively. We can then write the expected cost of S as E[S] = i (p
The left and right terms are the expected costs of Opt Nash and Opt soc , respectively, where all the buying costs are divided by k. Therefore, Opt Nash is not optimal in these settings. Contradiction. 2
As for the lower bound, consider the following example.
Example 27. For any > 0, suppose that the price at u 2 = u (1) s is k with a probability of 1, and the price at the leftmost store, u 1 is 0 with a probability of 1. The traveling cost from u 2 to u 1 is 1 + . In all other stores the price is very high and the traveling costs between any other store to u 2 is also very high, for instance 2k. Opt soc for this example is that agent 1 will go left and buy the product at u 1 . The cost of this strategy is 1 + , but it is not a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, agent 1 will prefer to buy the product in its initial location, u 2 , since its own cost will be 1, instead of 1 + in Opt soc . The total cost from this strategy will be k, and it is the only Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for any algorithm that finds a strategy S which is a Nash equilibrium,
, and the bound from Theorem 26 is tight.
Heterogeneous agents
The analysis so far assumes that all agents are of the same type, with identical capabilities. Specifically, the cost of obtaining the item at any given store is assumed to be the same for all agents. However, agents may be of different types and hence with different capabilities. For example, some agents may be equipped with a drilling arm, which allows them to consume less battery power while mining. In this section we consider situations of heterogeneous agents, and show that the results can be extended to such settings.
While agents may have different capabilities, in many cases it is reasonable to assume that if one agent is more capable than the other at one location, it is also more capable at all other locations (or at least not less capable). Hence the following definition: The algorithm is essentially the same dynamic programming algorithm described in Section 4.1. The consistency assumption is necessary for Lemmata 14 and 15 to remain true.
In any other case, we can do away with the consistency assumption. Clearly, however, we do need to assume that upon reaching a site, agents can assess the cost for obtaining the item for all other agents. Otherwise, communication would be meaningless. We obtain: The algorithms and proofs remain essentially the same as those for the case of homogeneous agents.
Discussion
In this paper we mainly analyzed the case where the stores are located along a path (either closed or non-closed). We see fair applicability of the proposed model to real-life applications. The most important/appropriate application, as discussed in the paper, is robot patrolling (see [60, 19, 2, 3] ). The reason is that a common patrolling scheme is patrolling along the surroundings of the area of interest, and the robot's movement is, by the task definition, restricted to be along a path even if there are shortcuts. However, there are additional important families of applications that the model can be mapped to -exploration along a path. Typical applications of this kind include:
• Finding a place for camping along a path -consider an expedition or a group of campers that follows a trail or travel along a river. When deciding on where to set their night camp, the group should consider different locations along their trail/river, each associated with some uncertainty related to the benefit from spending the night there.
• Positioning scouts -consider a border-control squad, which needs to position itself for scouting (e.g., based on some information that illegal infiltrators will arrive during the next few hours). Many possible locations along the border segment can potentially be used by the squad, each offering a different visibility level and accessibility to different point from where the infiltrators may arrive, which are a priori unknown (e.g., due to visibility conditions, terrain conditions and human factors).
• Deciding on a restaurant -consider a group that wants to dine together in one of the numerous restaurants on Balboa Blvd in Newport Beach. Assume that the true utility from dining in any of the restaurants can be observed only once getting to it (e.g., after observing the menu, how crowd it is and getting an impression of the general atmosphere).
• Deciding where to place bets -consider a visitor arriving to Las Vegas Blvd, interested in gambling in one of the casinos there. Similar to the restaurants' example, the gambler will be able to learn about the utility from gambling (not the expected payoff, which is likely to be similar in all places, but rather the gambling experience in terms of atmosphere, crowd, excitement, etc.) in any given casino only upon visiting it.
• Buying souvenirs -consider a tourist visiting the pier in Key West, Florida. Walking along the pier, the tourist will find many souvenir stores, selling practically the same items, however in different prices. In this case, the tourist should consider the tradeoff between the potential saving in cost and the alternative cost of time when going back and forth, visiting the different stores.
• Finding the best place to install a spying device at some place along a communication line -assume there are several possible locations along the line that are applicable for installing the equipment, each characterized by a different chance of being discovered or with a different chance of success.
All the above applications are characterized by a physical search along a line with potential locations that can be explored, where there is a distribution of potential gains/utilities for each location. Indeed, numerous physical environments may only be represented by a planar graph. Theorems 1 and 6 show that physical search problems are hard even on planar graphs and trees, even with a single agent, but finding a heuristic is of practical interest nonetheless. It seems that the first steps in building such a heuristic will be to utilize our results. For example, one should try to avoid repeated coverage as much as possible and restrict the number of cases where such coverage is necessary, as we showed in Theorem 12. Another idea is to convert the complex graph structure into a path, where each site on the path represents a region of strongly-connected nodes on the original graph. Many graphs which represent real physical environments consist of some regions with stronglyconnected nodes, but few edges connect these regions (for example, cities, have many roads inside but are connected by only a few highways). A heuristic algorithm for these graphs may use our algorithm to construct a strategy for the sites along the path, and use an additional heuristic for visiting the sites inside a region.
We also considered the case where mining costs are rounded/estimated to one of a constant number of possible options. We believe that this assumption is appropriate since the given input for our problems includes prior probabilistic knowledge. Usually, this data comes from some sort of estimation so it is reasonable to assume that the number of options is fixed; If there are too many possible values, an accurate estimation is hard to achieve. Nevertheless, if the number of costs will not be a constant it can be rounded to a fixed number of costs, which yields a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) for our problems.
We also assume that the agents seek only one item. As soon as more than one item is needed, our results do not hold, and seemingly the problems become NP-complete.
Conclusions and future work
This paper considers single and multi-agent physical search problems, with prior probabilistic knowledge. This integration of changing search cost into economic search models is important, as it improves the realism and applicability of the modeled problem. At the same time, it also dramatically increases the complexity of determining the agents' optimal strategies, precluding simple solutions such as easily computable reservation values (see for example "Pandora's problem" [57] , that was briefly discussed in Section 2.1.1). Indeed, we showed that our problems are hard on a metric space, sometimes even if it is a tree. We then focused on the path case, presenting polynomial algorithms for the two variants of Min-Expected-Cost problem, and proving hardness for Max-Probability and Min-Budget problems. We provided FPTAS for Min-Budget in that case, and showed that both problems are polynomial if the number of possible prices is bounded.
For the multi-agent case, we analyzed shared and private budget models. In the case of the shared budget, we showed how all of the single-agent algorithms extend to k-agents, with the time bounds growing exponentially in k. We proved that this is also the case with the private budget model, if the agents can communicate. In the case of the private budget with no communicating agents, we presented a polynomial algorithm that is suitable for any number of agents. We also extended the analysis to heterogeneous agents.
Finally, we considered the self-interested agents setting, showing how to find a Nash equilibrium for Min-Budget-Game and Min-Expected-Cost-Game in polynomial time. In both cases, we showed an upper bound on the ratio between this solution to the optimal one (the one which maximizes the social welfare) and proved that it is tight.
For future work, there are still many interesting open problems. With a single agent, the complexity of Min-Expected-Cost problem on a tree is yet to be explored. This case is interesting since it can be shown that Min-Expected-Cost is easy for a specific tree, namely star graph, where d is bounded. In the shared budget model, the complexity of k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost problem where k is part of the input is still open. In the private budget model, the complexity of all the problems with a non-constant number of communicating agents is open. In addition, there are interesting extensions to consider. We showed that most of our results can be extended to heterogeneous agents, with different buying capabilities. The next step is to analyze our results with heterogeneous agents with different traveling capabilities. Another direction is to add time constraint, which will possibly result with completely different optimal strategies. Currently, we assume that communication between the agent is free and reliable; a possible extension is to integrate communication costs to our model, and to handle the consequences of non-reliable communication. The Min-Budget-Game can also be extended; instead of defining the utility of achieving p succ as a step function ("high" if achieving p succ , and "low" if not), it could be defined as a linear function of p succ . Finally, metric spaces beyond the line remain an open challenge. As discussed in Section 7, the techniques and results given in this paper can facilitate the development of approximations and/or heuristics for the general metric space. along the way the price is 0, purchase and stop. Otherwise continue to the next node on the path. If at all points along the path the price is M, return to u s and purchase there, where the price is n!. The expected cost of this policy is as follows. The price of the initial step (from u s to u i 1 ) is a fixed 2n. For each j, the probability to obtain price 0 at u i j but not before is 2 − j . The cost of reaching u i j from u i 1 is j − 1. The probability that no u j has a price of 0 is 2 −n , in which case the purchase price is n!, plus n − 1 wasted steps along the Hamiltonian path and a cost of 2n for returning to u s . The total expected cost is thus exactly M.
Conversely, suppose that there is no Hamiltonian path in G. Clearly, since the price at u s is so large, any optimal strategy must check all nodes/stores {u 1 , . . . , u n } before purchasing at u s . Since there is no Hamiltonian path in G, any such exploration would be strictly more expensive than the one with a Hamiltonian path. Thus, the expected cost would be strictly
Theorem 2. The Min-Budget-Decide problem is NP-complete even on a path.
Proof. Given an optimal policy it is easy to compute its total cost and success probability in O (n) steps, therefore
Min-Budget-Decide is in NP. The proof of NP-hardness is by reduction from the 0-1 Knapsack problem, defined as follows. Given a knapsack of capacity C > 0 and N items, where each item has value v i ∈ Z + and size s i ∈ Z + , determine whether there is a selection of items (δ i = 1 if selected, 0 if not) that fits into the knapsack, i.e. Fig. 7 
Suppose there is a selection of items that fit the knapsack with a total value of at least V , and consider the following policy: go right from u g 0 to u g 1 . Then for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N, if δ i = 0 (item i was not selected) change direction and go to the other side to u g i+1 . Otherwise, continue in the current direction to u k i and only then change direction to u g i+1 . This policy's total travel cost is
thus the agent has enough budget to reach all u g i , and u k i with δ i = 1. When the agent reaches u g i , i < N + 1 it has already spent on traveling cost exactly
i so the agent has a probability of 1 − 2 −maxV to purchase the product at this store. When it reaches u g N+1 it is on the end of its tour and since the agent's total traveling cost is B − 1, here it also has a probability of 1 − 2 −maxV to purchase the product. When it reaches u k i it has already spent exactly
+ s i so the agent has a probability of 1 − 2 −v i to purchase the product in this store. In total, the success probability is
Suppose there is a policy, plc with a total travel cost that is less than or equal to B, and its success probability is at least p succ . Hence, plc's failure probability is at most 1 − p succ = 2 −maxV·(N+1) · 2 −V . Since maxV = N · max i v i , plc must reach all the N + 1 stores u g i with enough budget. Hence, plc must go right from u g 0 to u g 1 and then to each other u g i before u g i+1 . Therefore plc goes in a zigzag movement from one side of u s to the other side and so on repeatedly. plc also has to select some u k i to reach with enough budget. Thus, plc has to reach these u k i right after the corresponding store u g i . We use γ i = 1 to indicate the event in which plc selects to reach u k i right after u g i , and γ i = 0 to denote the complementary event. plc's total traveling cost is less than or equal to B − 1 to be able to purchase the product also at the last store, Given an instance of 0-1 Knapsack we build an instance for the Min-Budget-Decide problem as follows. We have N + 2 stores. N stores corresponds to the knapsack items, denoted by u k 1 , . . . , u k N . The other 2 stores are u 0 and u e , where u 0 is the agent's initial location. The stores are placed on a star, which is a tree with one internal node, u 0 , and N + 1 leaves. The distance to any u k i is defined according to the item size, dis(u 0 , u k i ) = s i /2, and dis(u 0 , u e ) = C . At any store u k i , either the product is available at the price of 0 with probability 1 − 2 −v i , or not available at any price. At store u 0 the product is not available, and at store u e either the product is available at the price of 0 with probability 1 − 2 −maxV , maxV = N · max i v i , or not available at any price. Finally, we set p succ = 1 − 2 −maxV · 2 −V , and B = 2 · C .
Suppose there is a selection of items that fit the knapsack with a total value of at least V , and consider the following policy: for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N, if δ i = 1 (item i was selected) go from u 0 to u k i and then back to u 0 . Finally, go from u 0 to u e . This policy's travel cost is
If the product is available at any store, its price is 0. Thus, the success probability of this policy is 1
Suppose there is a policy, plc with a total travel cost that is less than or equal to B, and its success probability is at least p succ . Hence, plc's failure probability is at most 1 − p succ = 2 −maxV · 2 −V . Since maxV = N · max i v i , plc must reach store u e . plc also has to select some u k i to reach, but since dis(u 0 , u e ) = C and B = 2 · C , plc must reach these u k i before reaching u e . We use γ i = 1 to indicate the event in which plc selects to reach u k i , and γ i = 0 to denote the complementary event. plc's traveling cost before going to u e is less than or equal C , to be able reach u e , so Proof. We start with k-Shared-Min-Expected-Cost phone . Since the stores are on the path, at any point in time the points/stores visited by the agents constitute a set of k disjoint contiguous intervals, which we call the visited intervals. Clearly, the algorithm need only make decisions at store locations. Furthermore, decisions can be limited to times when the agents are at one of the two stores edges of the visited interval. At each such location, each agent has only three possible actions: "go right" -extending its visited-interval one store to the right, "go left" -extending its visited-interval one store to the left, or "stop" -stopping the search and buying the product at the best price so far. Also note that after each agent i has already visited its interval [u (i) , u r (i) ], how exactly it covered this interval does not matter for any future decision; the costs have already been incurred. Accordingly, the states of the MDP are quadruplets [L, R, E, c], such that L = ( (1) , (2) , . . . , (k) ), R = (r (1) , r (2) , . . . , r (k) ), E = (e (1) , e (2) Transition to all other states has zero probability. Transitions for the "agent i go left" actions are analogous, while with the action "stop" there is probability 1 to transition to state Buy(c). This fully defines the MDP. The optimal strategy for finite-horizon MDPs can be determined using dynamic programming (see [45, Ch. 4] [u (i) , u r (i) ] has been visited by agent i and the item not yet purchased, then any future purchase within the interval (if there should be such a purchase) will be with an agent coming from outside the interval into the interval, and moving directly to a store for purchasing. Note that even if the interval [u (i) , u r (i) ] has been visited by agent i, the purchaser may also be one of its immediate neighbors (i.e., agents i − 1 and i + 1). In addition, there is a unique store u x (1) , (2) , . . . , (k) ), R = (r (1) , r (2) , . . . , r (k) ), E = (e (1) , e (2) , . . . , e (k) ), C = (c (1) , c (2) , . . . , c (k) ), X = (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (k) ), C r = (c r (1) , c r (2) , . . . , c r (k) ), and X r = (x r (1) Proof. Any strategy other than the ones specified in the lemma would reach all the stores covered by the optimal solution with at most the same available budget. 2
By the previous lemma, the moves of each agent are fully determined by the leftmost and rightmost stores of each Proof. For k agents, we extend the dynamic programming algorithm, which calculates fail[·, ·, ·, ·] and act[·, ·, ·, ·] tables, in the same way we extended the single agent algorithm in the proof of Theorem 8. We now save k disjoint intervals, thus the tables size becomes O ( −6k ). The rest of the approximation algorithm remains essentially the same. We still consider δ in powers of 2 up to β 2 n , where n is the size of the input. Thus, the total computation time is O (n −6k ). Since the approximation ratio in each interval is guaranteed to be (1 + ), we get a total ratio of (1 + k ). 2 Theorem 11. k-Shared-Min-Budget-Decide is NP-complete even on the path with a single price.
Proof. An optimal policy defines for each time step which agent should move and in which direction. Since there are at most 2m time steps, it is easy to compute the success probability and the total cost in O (m) steps, therefore the problem is in NP. The NP-hard reduction is from the 0-1 Knapsack problem.
We assume WLOG that all the points are on the line. We use N agents and our line consists of 2N stores. N stores correspond to the knapsack items, denoted u k 1 , . . . , u k N . The other N points are the starting point of the agents, {u
We set the left most point to u 
